The Strangest and Most Consequential Two Days

In what ranks as perhaps the strangest sequence of events in memory, early Saturday, Yevgeny Prigozhin turned on his long-time benefactor, Vladimir Putin, and declared his intention of ousting senior military leaders and perhaps Putin himself, an act he characterized as patriotic.  Twenty-four hours later, the whole enterprise was canceled, courtesy of peacemaking efforts by Belarus President, Alexander Lukashenko.  In effect, Prigozhin said, “never mind.”

What it all means and what the fallout will be are, for now, anyone’s guess.  So I will.

First, what’s next for Prigozhin?  As one observer mentioned, he should stay away from open windows, which sounds like good advice.  Putin agreed to let Prigozhin go into exile in Belarus with no criminal charges against him.  But Belarus a very far cry from safety.  For weeks now, Prigozhin has loudly berated the Russian high command, but most observers figured he had at least the tacit consent of Putin to do so.

But starting a civil war, which he almost did, is a bird of a different feather.  Prigozhin will be in danger all the days of his life, however long or short.

For now, what is his ongoing relationship with Wagner?  Does he still head the mercenary group that for years has been a cash cow for the Kremlin?  If so, of what does Wagner still consist?  All members who didn’t take part in the aborted insurrection have been offered contracts to fight for the Russian military.  All those who did have received amnesty and possibly a place in the army as well, but to whom, if anyone, do they pledge allegiance?

And what does the apparent break-up of Wagner do to the Russian army in Ukraine?  After all, Wagner was head-and-shoulders the better fighting force, time and again proving itself more effective and resolute than the main Russian army.  Is Wagner in Ukraine finished?  It can no longer recruit from Russian prisons, so how will it replenish its forces already greatly depleted by Prigozhin’s agreement to allow them to enter the Russian army.  If all its personnel accept that offer, does Wagner in Russia and Ukraine even exist?  Without Wagner, how effective will Russia be at prosecuting the war?

Of course, Wagner is far more than just a fighting unit.  Mostly, it’s a cluster of at least 64 shell companies whose primary function has always been to launder money made by Wagner in foreign climes and, at least until last Saturday, funnel it to the Russian state.  Now, it’s probable that Prigozhin made himself immensely wealthy in the process, so, given that, what can he do to continue as head of Wagner and remain a player on the world scene?  After all, the flow of money to Wagner from the oil fields of Syria and the gold mines of Africa won’t stop, but to whom will it now go?  My guess is that there soon will be a major power struggle inside Wagner; it makes far too much cash and Prigozhin appears too weak for there not to be.

Plus, as things now stand, what country in Africa, South America or elsewhere will want to sign contracts with Wagner with Prigozhin at its head?  He’s already proven himself capable of abruptly biting the hand that’s fed him for years.  Heads of state everywhere, far weaker and more vulnerable than Putin, will ask themselves “Why wouldn’t he do the same to me, but carry the insurrection through to the end?”  Prigozhin’s continuing presence at the head of Wagner endangers its ability to continue its vastly lucrative operations.

If Wagner wants to continue in business, and it surely does, Prigozhin has to go.  Meanwhile, the entire world is happy that Yevgeny Prigozhin isn’t the man in command of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.

Whatever happens to Wagner and Prigozhin, the important question is, “What’s the impact of last weekend’s events on Vladimir Putin?”  My surmise?  Profoundly negative.

A few self-evident truths:  First, Putin created the monster that almost plunged the country into civil war.  His judgement about whom to trust must surely now be called into question.  Second, he allowed Prigozhin and Wagner considerable freedom of action, failing to shorten the reins when he should have.  Third, when Wagner turned and attacked inside Russia, the army showed little inclination to fight to protect the current governing hierarchy.  Wagner entered and took over Rostov essentially unopposed and moved, with little resistance, to within 150 miles of Moscow. 

Furthering the conclusion that his support within the army is weak, Putin, far from demanding that the mutiny be crushed, signed Lukashenko’s peace agreement after just a few hours, hardly the action of a head of state sure of his power.  In addition, the military probably saw Wagner’s attack coming, but did nothing to stop it.  Does Putin enjoy so little support from the Russian military brass?  If so, those with the power to do so may well suggest to Putin that he needs, for the sake of the country, to step down.  How he would respond to such a suggestion is anyone’s guess.  If he refused, would stronger methods ensue?

Whatever the case, Putin now looks weaker than he’s ever been and at a most critical time for Russia and Russians.  This could easily be seen inside the Kremlin as precisely the time for new blood, a new leader, renewed hope and possibly a different policy in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Zelensky and his backers in the West couldn’t be happier.  In 48 hours, a man who looked to many like the backbone of the Russian war effort attacked his own country and government and then, with much success to show for his initiative, unaccountably fled.  No one among the Russian leadership looks stronger as a result and Putin’s ability to lead has probably been seriously impaired.  The results are a benefit to Ukraine, the U.S., our allies in Europe and of course Joe Biden.  If Putin goes, look for Biden to claim credit and neocons in the State Department to break out the champagne.

For now, the situation is maximally fluid.  It could all be different tomorrow, but that’s what it looks like today.